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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. McINTOSH, Trustee in 
Bankruptcy, Estate of BOUNTI-
FUL MA TE RIALS & CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., 
B-446-65, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendant arnd Respondent. 
Case 
No.11078 
RESP'ONDENT'S BRIEF 
srrATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Trustee's action was to invalidate and 
oust Drfondant 's liens, claims, rights and priority, ac-
cording to its Mortgages of Chattels and its After Ac-
q uirrd Property Agreement, on property seized by and 
i11 Plaintiff-Trustee's possession after April 21, 1965. 
Defornlant counterclaimed asserting the validity and pri-
ority of its position and security instruments and that 
])0fondant also had a first, paramount and subsisting 
liPn on all the chattel property of the Mortgagor acquired 
ns of, on and after ?\fay 20, 1963, being superior to the 
PlaiHtiff-Trustee 's rights, claims and interests, if any. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court entered a Summary J udgrnent in 
favor of Defendant and, among other things, ruled that 
Defendant's After Acquired Property Agreement and 
Mortgages of Chattels were prior and valid and that the 
after-acquired property provisions in the Mortgages and 
Note were valid and enforceable. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant asks that the Summary Judg-
ment of the Lower Court be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are fairly stated in Appellant's Brief, 
however, the following facts should also be stated. 
A copy of the Note dated May 20, 1963, is a part 
of the record before this Court, and the after-acquired 
property provision is stated on Page 2 of the Note under 
"Negative Covenants" in Paragraph 1, a part of which 
is as follows : 
f . d " "whether now owned or herea ter acqmre . 
A copy of the May 20, 1963, Chattel Mortgage, Utah 
Certificate of Title, and Guaranty are parts of the record 
before this Court. 
A copy of the April 5, 1965, Chattel Mortgage is also 
a part of the record before this Court, and the after-
acquired property provisions are on the first page, in 
part, as follows : 
"hereafter acquired by Mortgagor." 
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POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE AFTER-ACQUIRED 
PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN THE NOTE 
DATED MAY 20, 1963, CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
DATED MAY 20, 1963, THE AFTER AC-
QUIRED PROPERTY AGREEMENT DATED 
MAY 20, 1963, AND THE CHATTEL MORT-
GAGE DATED APRIL 5, 1965, ARE VALID IN 
UTAH; AND THAT THE SECURITY IN-
STRUMENTS OWNED AND HELD BY DE-
FENDANT CREATED A PRIOR, PARA-
MOUNT AND SUBSISTING LIEN ON THE 
CHATTEL PROPERTY SUPERIOR TO ANY 
ASSERTED INTEREST AND CLAIM OF 
PLAINTIFF-TRUSTEE. 
The Lower Court entered an Order granting De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This case appears to be one of first impression 
in Utah and came on regularly for hearing be-
fore the Court on plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and on defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment. John H. Allen, Esq., appeared 
for the plaintiff. Walker E. Anderson, Assistant 
United States Attorney, appeared for the defend-
ant. After arguments and statements by counsel, 
the case was submitted to the Court. Based upon 
the pleadings, exhibits in evidence, stipulations 
and all documents on file and in the interest of 
justice and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises finds and concludes that the defendant 
is entitled to Summary Judgment being entered 
as a matter of law, and that execution may issue. 
The Note, After Acquired Property Agree-
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ment, Guaranty, Mortgage of Chattels dated May 
20, 1963, Mortgage of Chattels dated April 5, 
1965, and the Certificate of Title, being exhibits 
on file herein, aud given to the Government, show 
the agreement, value and the mortgagor's rights 
in the chattel property. 
The intention of the parties is manifest from 
the language of the written documents. The inten-
tion of the parties, and especially the mortgagor, 
was to give the defendant a first, valid, prior and 
subsisting lien on all of the chattel property of 
the mortgagor acquired as of, on and after May 
20, 1963, being superior to the plaintiff's rights, 
claims and interests, if any. 
Plaintiff is estopped to deny and vary the 
terms of the Chattel Mortgage of May 20, 1963, 
including therein the after-acquired property pro-
visions and the After Acquired Property Agree-
ment. 
Plaintiff has no greater or superior rights as 
Trustee in Bankruptcy than the mortgagor. 
The after-acquired property provisions in the 
Chattel Mortgage dated May 20, 1963, and the 
After Acquired Property Agreement dated May 
20, 1963, are valid provisions, and these docu-
ments are valid, and the documents and the after-
acquired property provisions therein created a 
prior, paramount and subsisting lien on all chattel 
property acquired by the mortgagor, in favor of 
the defendant, being superior to any rights, inter-
ests and claims of plaintiff, if any. 
The Note dated May 20, 1963, mentions "here-
after acquired'' property. 
The defendant has a valid, prior and subsist-
ing lien on the 1962 Chevrolet Truck. 
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Plaintiff should hand over to defendant 
$2,590.00; and hand over to defendant all unsold 
chattel property. 
The defendant has and had a prior, paramount 
and subsisting lien on all the mortgagor's chattels 
before any rights, claims and interests of the 
Trustee-Plaintiff came into existence. It is, 
therefore, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That the Note dated May 20, 1963, is valid. 
2. That the After Acquired Property Agree-
ment dated May 20, 1963, is valid and enforceable. 
3. That the Mortgage of Chattels dated May 
20, 1963, is valid; and the after-acquired property 
provisions therein are valid; and the Mortgage 
and after-acquired property provisions therein 
are enforceable. 
4. That the Mortgage of Chattels dated April 
5, 1965, is a valid document; and the after-ac-
quired property provisions therein are valid. 
5. That the Utah Certificate of Title on the 
1962 Chevrolet Truck is valid, and a prior and 
subsisting lien exists in favor of the defendant; 
and the defendant's rights thereto are superior to 
the claims and interests of the Plaintiff-Trustee. 
6. That the defendant had and has a first, val-
id, prior, paramount and subsisting l~en on all 
chattel property of the mortgagor acquired as of, 
on, or after May 20, 1963, including the property 
listed herein by virtue of the liens and the after-
acquired property provisions in the Mortgage of 
Chattels and After Acquired Property Agreement 
executed by the mortgagor, in favor of the de-
fendant, on May 20, 1963. 
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7. That the defendant had and has a first val-
id, prior a~d subsisting lien on all chattel ;rop-
erty supenor to any rights claims and interests 
of plaintiff. ' 
8. That the plaintiff is estopped to deny and 
vary the terms of the Note dated May 20, 1963, 
Mortgage of C~a ttels dated May 20, 1963, and 
the After Acqmred Property Agreement dated 
May 20, 1963. 
9. That the plaintiff shall hand over to the de-
fendant all money received from the sale of the 
chattel property, which is $2,590.00. 
10. That the plaintiff shall hand over and sur-
render possession of the following chattels to the 
defendant: 
Century Water Softener, Model 110-F APT 
Bruner Water Filter, Model AClOAB 
Krane Kar 
Office Desk, and 
all chattels now held or possessed by the plaintiff 
in this case. 
11. Execution may be issued on behalf of the 
defendant. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 1967. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ STEW ART M. HANSON, Judge 
Bountiful Materials and Construction Company, 
Inc., about May 20, 1963, procured a loan from the Small 
Business Administration in the amount of $25,000.00, 
for business operation purposes, and gave SBA a Note, 
Guaranty, Supplemental Mortgage of Chattels and an 
After Acquired Property Agreement. The Chattel Mort-
gage was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
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Office on May 27, 1963. The Chattel Mortgage and the 
Note also contained the usual after-acquired property 
prov1s10ns. 
The Mortgagor defaulted. Thereafter, SBA agreed 
to forbear foreclosing, and the Mortgagor executed and 
gave to SBA a Mortgage of Chattels dated April 5, 1965, 
and a Utah Certificate of Title on a 1962 Chevrolet Truck. 
The Chattel Mortgage was recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office on April 5, 1965, and was filed 
with the Utah State Tax Commission on April 23, 1965. 
Sixteen days after April 5, 1965, without knowledge or 
notice to SBA, the Mortgagor filed in Federal Court in 
Bankruptcy on April 21, 1965, B-446-65; James A. Mc-
Intosh was appointed Trustee; and the Mortgagor ceased 
operations of business. The Trustee Disclaimed and the 
Referee executed an Order Authorizing Disclaimer as to 
all chattels identified in the SBA Chattel Mortgage dated 
:'11ay 20, 1963. 
After his appointment, the Trustee seized and took 
possession of all the chattels identified in the SBA Mort-
gage of Chattels dated April 5, 1965, to the exclusion of 
all the world. He asserted and maintained whole and to-
tal ownership of these chattels. The chattels are iden-
tified on Page 2 of Appellant's Brief. 
Until January 1, 1966, when Utah adopted the Uni-
form Commercial Code, Utah UCC Title 70A, see 70A-9-
108 and 70A-9-204, the Utah Code was apparently silent 
with regards to the after-acquired property clauses. Also, 
sep the discussion in UCC 1962 Official Text, Pages 629-
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630 and 642-646. The Utah Supreme Court apparently 
has been silent on the question of after-acquired property 
clauses. 
rrhe States of California, Oklahoma and Washington 
have declared that an after-acquired property clause in a 
chattel mortgage is valid, Oliver v. Electrical, 367 P. 2d 
618. Also, Utah's sister State, Idaho, in Diamond Na-
tional Corporation v. Lee, 333 F. 2d 517 recognizes the 
rule that after-acquired property clauses in chattel mort-
gages are Yalid by statute, Section 45-107, and decisional 
law in Idaho. As announced by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Poage v. Co-Operative Pub. Co. et al., 66 P. 2d 1119, 
it seems perfectly clear that the parties intended that the 
trust mortgage should cover not only the property then 
owned by the Publishing Company but all personal prop-
erty which it might thereafter acquire and that it is suf-
ficient where, as here, the intention of the parties, that 
after-acquired property should he covered by the mort-
gage and held as security for the debt, is manifest from 
the language of the instrument. 
It appearing that the Utah Supreme Co1trt being 
silent as to after-acquired property clauses, this Court 
should follow the United States Supreme Court as an-
nounced by that Court in the Ecker and Wade cases. 
In TVade v. Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Rail-
road Company, et al., 149 U. S. 327, the Court states on 
Page 341: 
''The 'after-acquired clause' in the mortgage of 
the Chicago, Springfield and St. Louis Railroad 
Company, under the decisions of this court, covers 
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all acquisitions made to that property by either 
t~e construction company or others acquiring 
rights under it. Dunham v. Cincinnati, Peru &c. 
Railway Co., 1 Wall. 254; Galveston Railroad v. 
Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459; Porter v. Bessemer Steel 
Co., 122 U.S. 267; Toledo &c. Railroad v. Hamil-
ton, 134 U.S. 296; Central Trust Co. v. Kneeland, 
138 U.S. 414. In this latter case it was held that 
the 'after-acquired property clause' of a mort-
gage will cover not only legal acquisitions, but all 
equitable rights and interests subsequently ac-
quired by or for the mortgagor." 
The Wade case held that the appellants' prior lien 
ca~nnot be cut off or displaced and that the appellants' 
prior lien is a clear and undoubted priority over a later 
mortgage and that the Circuit Court erred in not allowing 
appellants the full amount of their bonds and in not de-
claring said bonds a lien upon the entire line of the 
railroad. 
SBA is entitled to exercise its legal and equitable 
rights under the after-acquired property clause and 
Agreement of 1963 to sell the chattels identified in the 
1965 Chattel Mortgage or to receive all the proceeds from 
the sale of the property. Just because the Debtor-Mort-
gagor filed in Bankruptcy, neither the Bankruptcy Act 
nor the Bankruptcy Court can elevate the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy to a priority position over SBA's priority 
lien position with regards to all the chattels described 
in the Supplemental Mortgage of Chattels of April 5, 
1965. 
The United States Supreme Court in the 67 page 
case of Ecker et al. v. Western Pacific Railroad Corpo-
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ration, et al., 318 U. S. 448, leaves no room for doubt but 
that SBA has a first, prior and secured lien and can fore-
close upon all of the chattels itemized in the Mortgage 
of Chattels dated April 5, 1965, because of the after-
acquired property clause in SBA 's Mortgage of Chattels 
dated May 20, 1963, and Agreement, or receive the pro-
ceeds from the sale by the Trustee. In the Ecker case 
the question was whether the property is within the terms 
of the first Mortgage and the Court answered affirma-
tively because of the after-acquired property clause in 
the first Mortgage. In the Ecker case, ICC held that the 
first Mortgage was senior to the refunding Mortgage and 
should be considered to be a first lien on three classes of 
property; i.e., ( 1) after-acquired rolling stock and equip-
ment acquired under equipment trusts and leases; (2) 
the debtor's interests in an after-acquired branch rail-
road line; and (3) the debtor's title to certain non-carrier 
reality; the District Court adopted the ICC ruling; the 
Ninth Circuit reversed on appeal but did not pass on the 
after-acquired property claim issue. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the District Court's conclusions adopting the 
ICC's determinations as to the priority of the first Mort-
gage. The Ecker case was followed in Bankers Trust 
Company, et al. v. Calloway, et al., 148 F. 2d 631 
(5th CA). 
The present case is similar in many respects to the 
case of Ri11erview State Bank v. Ernest, 198 F. 2d 876, 
Tenth Circuit 1952, Rehearing Denied in 1952, Cert. De-
nied, 344 U. S. 892. In that case the mortgagor gave the 
original Note and Mortgage and later gave Supplemental 
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Mortgages of Chattels. After default, a petition in invol-
untary Bankruptcy was filed against the Bankrupt and 
an Order of Adjudication was entered; and a Trustee 
was duly selected and qualified. The Supplemental Mort-
gages had been recorded. The Tenth Circuit, among other 
things, stated that the rights of the Bank were prior and 
~uperior to those of a garnisheeing creditor and there-
fore its rights were prior and paramount to those of 
the Trustee in Bankruptcy, and the Tenth Circuit stated 
further, 
''While the question is not free from doubt, we 
think it is fairly clear that a mortgage covering an 
oil and gas leasehold in Kansas which is recorded 
in the mortgage records of the county wherein the 
property is situated but not filed and entered 
upon the chattel mortgage records fixes and fas-
tens a lien upon the property effective from the 
date of the filing and recording of the mortgage 
as against a subsequently appointed trustee in 
bankruptcy.'' 
In re George Va.rratos, 159 F. Supp. 730, the Trial 
Court discussed Section 70, sub. c. of the Bankruptcy Act 
(11 U.S.C.A. Section 110) and stated that, 
''If the mortgages are valid liens, having been 
filed on time it would appear that the Trustee 
has no rights whatsoever despite Section 70-c 
since he would be only in the position of a creditor 
that came into existence and even if such a credi-
tor might have existed he would have no rights 
if the mortgages were filed within a reasonable 
time.'' 
The Order for the Trial Court was affirmed, 259 
F'. 2d 920. 
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In Robert TY. Mattlzews, as Trustee in Bankruptcy 
of Beard & Company, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James 
Talcott, Inc., Defendant-Appdlee, 345 F. 2d 374, the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the entire Judgment by the District 
Court, and Cert. was denied, 382 U. S. 837. A part of 
this case is recorded as follo\vs: 
''Five issues were presented to the district 
court for decision: (1) whether designations of 
lumber i11ventory made within four months prior 
to bankruptcy were voidable preferences under 
section GO of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. Sec-
tion 96; ( 2) whether the bankrupt's inventory of 
wood mouldings was subject to the factor's lien; 
( 3) whether warehouse receipts held by Talcott 
co\·ering lnmher deposited in a field warehouse lo-
cated on the bankrupt's premises were valid; ( 4) 
whether accounts receivable assigned by the bank-
rupt to Talcott within ten days of bankruptcy and 
gro\ving out of sale of lumber covered by the fac-
tor's lien constituted voidable preferences; and 
( 5) whether a chattel mortgage held by Talcott 
covered leasehold improvements and other items 
of equipment. 
"The district court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, deciding in favor of Talcott 
on all issues. From the judgment this appeal was 
taken. 
* * * * 
''The mortgage listed specific property identified 
as being located at the premises of the bankrupt. 
In addition to the specific listing of properties 
subject to the mortgage, the mortgage contained 
a blanket clause 'including all small tools, dies, 
and all other goods and ehattels of every descrip-
tion and kind.' The instrument also covered 'all 
stock, fixtures, tools, dies, jigs, goods, wares, mer-
chandise and ot lwr chattels * * * 110\\T situated on 
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the said premises or which may be hereafter ac-
quired by and placed on the said premises by the 
mortgagor at any time hereafter, together with 
all other goods and chattels of the mortgagor.' 
''The items the trustee now challenges as not spe-
cifically listed in the chattel mortgage were cer-
tain leasehold improvements, an automobile, a 
truck, an electric motor, an off-set press, a copy-
ing machine, and a radio music system. The dis-
trict court, however, found that all of these items 
were covered by the blanket clause and concluded 
therefrom that the proceeds from their sale be-
longed to Talcott. Although the more desirable 
procedure would be to describe with greater spe-
cificity the property subject to a chattel mortgage, 
the blanket clause here covering all property at a 
specified location was sufficient to subject that 
property to the terms of the mortgage.'' 
The Mortgagor in this case intended to and did se-
cure SBA for the loan and SBA properly recorded its 
Mortgages. The Lower Court has decreed that the after-
acquired property clauses are valid and enforceable. 
The Government requests this Court to affirm the 
Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE LIEN, ON THE 1962 
CHEVROLET TRUCK, WAS VALID IN VIEW 
OF THE FACT THAT A COPY OF THE 
CHATTEL MORTGAGE OF APRIL 5, 1965, 
WAS FILED WITH THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION 2 DAYS AFTER THE MORT-
GAGOR PETITIONED IN BANKRUPTCY. 
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Plaintiff-Trustee places great stress and emphasis 
upon Sections 41-1-80-87 Utah Code Annotated. How-
ever, these Sections do not require or demand a footrace 
of SBA in filing its April 5, rn65, Chattel Mortgage with 
the Utah State Tax Commission. This Mortgage was rea-
sonably and seasonably filed hy SBA with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office on April 5, 1965, and there-
after filed on April 23, 1965, with the Tax Commission. 
It took a few days for the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office to record the 1Iortgage. SBA had no knowledge or 
notice that the Mortgagor would plunge and thrust it-
self into Bankruptcy on April 21, 1965, just 16 days 
after SBA received this Mortgage. 
The lien of SBA on the 1962 Chevrolet Truck is val-
id. Justice and equity require that the Summary Judg-
ment be affirmed. 
The Government maintains that the 1963 Chattel 
Mortgage and the After Acquired Property Agreement 
are valid liens on the 1962 Chevrolet Truck identified iu 
the 1965 Mortgage and that the Government is entitled to 
the Truck or the proceeds therefrom. Both Mortgages 
were properly filed and recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office before Bankruptcy filing on 
April 21, 1965; also, the Utah Certificate of Title shows 
on its face that SBA is the mortgagee. In Emery v. Unio·11 
Inv. Co., In re Cotter, '.H2 F. 2d 183, before the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the appeal involved the validity of a Chattel l\Iort-
gage ·which secured a X ote given for the purchase of a 
motor yehicle prior to Bankruptcy. Tlw dispute arises 
between the Trusffe and Mortgagre. The Court, amon1r 
other things, stated that the Chattel :'IIortgagc-s remained 
undischarged of record, and, 
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''In a well-reasoned opm10n, the District Court 
decided: 
'In the absence of the facts and circumstances to 
manifest a contrary intention of the parties the 
taking of a new note for one secured by a (~hat­
tel) mortgage is not payment, does not extinguish 
the debt evidenced thereby, and does not dis-
charge the (chattel mortgage) security for the 
earlier note. The mortgage secures the debt, of 
which the note is mere evidence. A change of the 
evidence of an indebtedness neither discharges 
the obligation nor releases the security which fol-
1 ows the debt.' (113 F. Supp. 860.)" 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED 
TO DENY AND VARY THE TERMS OF THE 
CHATTEL MORTGAGE DATED MAY 20, 
1963, AND THE AFTER ACQUIRED PROP-
ERTY AGREEMENT, AND SEA'S SECURED 
PRIORITY POSITION. 
When the Trustee was appointed after April 21, 
1965, he seized all the chattels described in the SBA 
April 5, 1965, Chattel Mortgage and maintained total 
ownership to the exclusion of SBA. This seizure and 
claimed ownership wholly ignored SBA 's documents 
and the after-acquired property provisions in the docu-
ments held and owned by SBA. This seizure and claimed 
ownership wholly denied to SBA its rights and security 
as described in its documents. This seizure and claimed 
u\rnership by the Trustee totally varied and destroyed 
the effect of SBA 's documents and the terms therein. 
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The Plaintiff-Trustee had knowledge and notice of 
SBA 's recorded Mortgages and the after-acquired 
property provisions therein. The Circuit Court in Stock-
yards Loan Company v. Nichols, 243 F. Rep. 511, recog-
nized along with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma the 
Mortgagee's legal lien upon such after acquired property. 
"It is still the rule that estoppels should be resort-
ed to solely as a means of preventing injustice 
28 Am. J ur. 2d 601. 
* * *"· ' 
The Lower Court stayed and stopped the mighty 
hand of the Trustee, a hypothetical creditor, by its Sum-
mary Judgment in favor of the Defendant and the Sum-
mary Judgment should be affirmed, thereby following 
the Tenth Circuit. See also United States v. Evans, 245 
F. 2d 681 (N.M.); and United States v. Cassidy Commis-
sion Co., 263 F. Supp. 1019 (Okla.), as affirmed by the 
Tenth Circuit in the September Term, 1967, No. 9511. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully suggests that the Summary 
,T udgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM T. THUR1\[AN 
Unitecl States Attorney 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
Assistant United States Attorney 
200 U. S. Post Office & Court House 
350 South ]\fain 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Reswmrlent 
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